Ciclo de Seminarios Permanentes

Presentador

Andrés Fioriti

- Presencial -

Andrés es economista y es Profesor Asistente de Economía en la Universidad Nacional del Sur e investigador del INMABB-CONICET. Obtuvo su doctorado en Economía en la Universidad de Warwick, en 2016. Sus principales intereses de investigación se centran en Información, Diseño de Mecanismos, Teoría de Juegos y Economía Financiera.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 9 de junio de 11:20 a 12:30 h. 

Aula H118, Ed. Hirsch (1er Piso).

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Independent allocation of control and cash-flow rights

Firms' issuance of non-linear securities, such as debt or options, creates risk-shifting incentives that may lead to inefficient outcomes. This widely accepted result rests on the assumption that firms' control rights are coupled with the residual claims, and thus held by equity holders. We relax this assumption and analyze a setting where cash-flow and control rights are allocated independently. Although payoffs are determined solely by rights over realized cash flows, control rights hold value because they influence the probability distribution of those cash flows. Cash-flow and control rights often act as substitutes, but cash-flow rights can reduce investors' payoff when their impact on decision-making is sufficiently strong. When issuers and holders of a non-linear security have sufficiently distinct cash-flow rights, the equilibrium features efficiency with full surplus extraction; as their cash-flow rights converge, a trade-off between efficiency and surplus extraction emerges. In that case, a sufficiently skewed distribution of payoffs can restore efficiency.

Ciclo de Seminarios Permanentes

Presentador

Mariano Tommasi

- Presencial -

Mariano es economista y tiene un doctorado en Economía de la Universidad de Chicago. Es Profesor Plenario del Departamento de Economía de la Universidad de San Andrés y director del Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Humano. Es Fellow de la Econometric Society. Se especializa en economía política, economía institucional, pobreza y políticas sociales.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 2 de junio de 11:20 a 12:30 h. 

Aula H118, Ed. Hirsch (1er Piso).

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The Political Economy of Post-Inclusion Democracies: Incorporation, Cooperation, and Political Equilibria

Over recent decades, many Latin American democracies have expanded political participation, social rights, and redistribution, yet have simultaneously experienced rising discontent, policy volatility, and institutional fragility. This coexistence challenges standard political economy models that associate democratization with greater stability and accountability.

This paper argues that incorporation—the expansion of effective participation in political and policymaking processes—alters the cooperation problem itself. While broader participation raises the potential gains from collective action, it also increases coordination costs and the institutional demands required to sustain self-enforcing cooperation. A simple model shows that as participation expands, the minimum level of institutional adaptation required for cooperation rises; when such adaptation lags, polities may become trapped in low-cooperation equilibria marked by polarization and short time horizons.

Comparative case studies of Uruguay, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela illustrate how similar inclusionary processes generate divergent political trajectories depending on whether cooperative governance adjusts to expanded participation. Where cooperation is rebuilt, inclusion supports legitimacy and durable governance; where it is not, expanded voice yields instability and, in extreme cases, democratic breakdown.

Ciclo de Seminarios Permanentes

Presentador

Santiago Oliveros

- Presencial -

Santiago es economista y obtuvo su doctorado en Economía en la Universidad de Wisconsin-Madison en 2006. Actualmente se desempeña como Profesor de Economía en la Universidad de Bristol, cargo que ocupa desde 2020. A lo largo de su carrera ha pasado por varias instituciones de prestigio, como la Haas School of Business de UC Berkeley (2006-2012), Royal Holloway, University of London (2012-2013), y la Universidad de Essex (2013-2020). Sus principales intereses de investigación son la Teoría Microeconómica y la Economía Política.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 26 de mayo de 11:20 a 12:30 h. 

Aula H118, Ed. Hirsch (1er Piso).

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Collaboration Between and Within Groups

We study the ability of multi-group teams to undertake binary projects in a decentralized environment. The equilibrium outcomes of our model display familiar features in collaborative settings, including inefficient gradualism, inaction, and contribution cycles, wherein groups alternate taking responsibility for moving the project forward. Expected delay grows more than proportionally with project size, and some welfare-enhancing projects are not completed, even as agents become arbitrarily patient. A team composed of two equally large groups can complete larger projects than a fully homogenous team, even as the difference in preferences for completion among the two groups is arbitrarily small. Moreover, if the project is sufficiently large, the two-group team always completes the project strictly faster.

Se viene una nueva edición de UdeSA Career Camp

La feria laboral vuelve al Campus Victoria para reunir en un mismo espacio a estudiantes, graduados y organizaciones.

Durante dos días, vas a poder conversar con empleadores de distintas industrias, conocer sus roles y desafíos, y explorar oportunidades profesionales. 

Un evento pensado para recién graduado/as y estudiantes UdeSA de todos los años y carreras.

Vení a conectar, aprender y proyectar tu futuro.

► 14 y 15 de mayo de 10.30 a 16.00 h

► Campus Victoria [CUBO]

*No requiere inscripción.

¡Te esperamos!

ACTIVIDAD NO ARANCELADA 

Para estudiantes y recién graduados UdeSA

Ciclo de Seminarios Permanentes

Presentadora

Victoria Anauati

- Presencial -

Victoria es economista y Doctora en Economía por la Universidad de San Andrés (2018). Desde 2013 realiza investigaciones en las áreas de educación, microeconometría y economía del desarrollo para organismos internacionales como el BID y J-PAL. Actualmente se desempeña como Directora del Departamento de Investigación de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas de la Universidad Católica Argentina.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 5 de mayo de 11:20 a 12:30 h. 

Aula S117, Ed. Sullair (1er Piso).

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Progressivity, Sorting, and the Measurement of In-Kind Public Transfers: The Case of Education

Conventional benefit-incidence analyses often find public education spending to be progressive, particularly at basic and secondary levels. However, in systems with substantial private provision, measured progressivity may partly reflect income-based sorting between public and private schools rather than redistributive features of public spending itself. This paper refines the interpretation of standard progressivity measures by explicitly accounting for such sorting. Focusing on public secondary education in Argentina, we exploit cross-provincial variation in private school participation to decompose observed progressivity into a mechanical component driven by differential take-up and a structural component reflecting spending design and unit costs. Using a transparent counterfactual reweighting approach, we show that income-based sorting plays a quantitatively important and heterogeneous role across provinces, in some cases inflating and in others attenuating measured progressivity. Once sorting effects are accounted for, cross-provincial differences in progressivity are substantially reduced and provincial rankings change meaningfully. These findings underscore the importance of enrollment patterns for the measurement of the distributive incidence of in-kind public spending and provide a simple adjustment that can be readily incorporated into standard fiscal incidence analyses.

Ciclo de Seminarios Permanentes

Presentadora

Verónica Amarante

- Presencial -

Verónica es economista y Directora de Investigaciones Socioeconómicas en CAF (Banco de Desarrollo de América Latina y el Caribe) y Profesora Titular del Departamento de Economía de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Administración de la Universidad de la República (UdelaR) en Uruguay. Fue Directora de la Oficina de Montevideo de CEPAL, Directora del Instituto de Economía de la UdelaR, e investigadora del mismo instituto. También se desempeñó en la División de Desarrollo Social de CEPAL Sus intereses de investigación se centran en desarrollo económico, género y economía laboral, con especial énfasis en Uruguay y América Latina.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 28 de abril de 11:20 a 12:30 h. 

Aula S117, Ed. Sullair (1er Piso).

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Reproducing Gender Inequality: Adolescent Time Use and Parental Influence in Colombia and Mexico

This paper examines the intergenerational transmission of time use patterns among adolescents in Colombia and Mexico, with a particular focus on unpaid work. Using recent nationally representative time use surveys from both countries, we analyze how adolescents' time allocation relates to their parents' behaviors and attitudes. Our findings reveal significant gender differences in time use: girls dedicate more time to unpaid work and personal care, while boys spend more time on leisure activities. The analysis yields three main contributions. First, we find robust evidence of intergenerational transmission of behaviors: adolescents' time devoted to unpaid work is positively correlated with their same-sex parent's time allocation to these activities, with stronger father-son and mother-daughter associations. Second, the gender gap in unpaid work between adolescent siblings is positively correlated with their parents' gender gap, suggesting that household gender inequalities are reproduced across generations. Third, in Colombia, where attitudinal data is available, we find that traditional gender attitudes are significantly associated with girls' (but not boys') time spent on housework, with maternal attitudes exerting particularly strong influence. These findings highlight how gender roles and inequalities in unpaid work are transmitted across generations through both behavioral patterns and attitudinal socialization. The results underscore the importance of addressing both structural constraints and cultural norms in policies aimed at promoting gender equality in domestic work, particularly during adolescence—a critical period for the formation of lifelong behavioral patterns.

¿Necesitás actualizar tu foto de LinkedIn?

Vení y renovala en el momento con una fotógrafa profesional 

¿Cuándo y Dónde?

21 de abril | 10 a 13 h
22 de abril | 13 a 16 h
1er piso, Edificio Sullair

Pasá cuando quieras en esa franja horaria:

• Esperá tu turno
• Escaneá el QR y dejá tus datos
• Recibí tus fotos por mail

¿Y si además tenés dudas sobre el Career Camp?

El equipo de Desarrollo Porfesional va a estar presente para que te acerques y hagas todas las preguntas que quieras sobre la feria laboral.

¡Te esperamos! No hace falta inscripción

Ciclo de Seminarios Permanentes

Presentador

Guillermo Cruces

- Presencial -

Guillermo es investigador y profesor de Economía de grado y posgrado en la Universidad de San Andrés, y también tiene un nombramiento conjunto como Profesor de Economía en la School of Economics de la Universidad de Nottingham. Además, es investigador del CONICET. Sus principales áreas de investigación son la Economía Laboral, Distribución del Ingreso y Evaluación de Impacto de Políticas Públicas. Obtuvo su PhD en Economía en London School of Economics (LSE).

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 21 de abril de 11:20 a 12:30 h. 

Aula H118, Ed. Hirsch (1er Piso).

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Does Generative AI Narrow Education-Based Productivity Gaps? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment

Does generative artificial intelligence (AI) reinforce or reduce productivity differences across workers? Existing evidence largely studies AI within firms and occupations, where organizational selection compresses educational heterogeneity, leaving unclear whether AI narrows productivity gaps across individuals with substantially different levels of formal education. We address this question using a randomized online experiment conducted outside firms, in which 1,174 adults aged 25–45 with heterogeneous educational backgrounds complete an incentivized, workplace-style business problem-solving task. The task is a general (not domain-specific) exercise, and participants perform it either with or without access to a generative-AI assistant. Unlike prior work that studies heterogeneity within relatively homogeneous worker samples, our design targets the between–education-group productivity gap as the primary estimand. We find that AI increases productivity for all participants, with substantially larger gains for lower-education individuals. In the absence of AI access, higher-education participants outperform lower-education participants by 0.548 standard deviations; with AI access, this gap falls to 0.139 standard deviations, implying that generative AI closes three-quarters of the initial productivity gap. We interpret this pattern as evidence that generative AI narrows effective productivity differences in task execution by relaxing constraints that are more binding for lower-education individuals, even though underlying skill differences remain, as reflected in persistent education gaps in task performance and in a follow-up exercise without AI assistance.

Ciclo de Seminarios Permanentes

Presentador

Juan Segnana

- Presencial -

Juan es economista y está haciendo su Doctorado en Economía en la Universidad de Tilburg, con intereses de investigación en la intersección entre economía del desarrollo, migraciones y economía política. Su trabajo se centra en países en desarrollo, utilizando datos administrativos, de encuestas y geoespaciales para estudiar cómo el contacto interétnico influye en las actitudes hacia los refugiados y qué fricciones del mercado laboral dificultan su integración económica.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 14 de abril de 11:20 a 12:30 h. 

Aula H118 (Ed. Hirsch, 1er Piso).

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Prolonged Crises, Intergroup Contact, and Interethnic Attitudes

How does prolonged intergroup exposure affect interethnic attitudes? Evidence on whether intergroup contact improves social cohesion remains inconclusive. We build a unique qualitative and quantitative dataset capturing interethnic attitudes between Rohingya refugees and their neighboring Bangladeshi hosts in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh. Exploiting a quasi-natural experiment stemming from the expansion of refugee camps that generated spatial variation in intergroup proximity, we find asymmetric effects. Intergroup closeness and contact worsen host views toward refugees but do not shape Rohingya views toward Bangladeshi. Results hold across contact contexts, frequencies, and durations. Shallow, infrequent contact dominates the margin of interactions. Competition in informal labor markets emerges as the most plausible mechanism driving anti-refugee sentiment among hosts.

Ciclo de Seminarios Permanentes

Presentador

Shanker Satyanath

- Presencial -

Shanker Satyanath es profesor de Ciencias Políticas en la Universidad de Nueva York (NYU). Obtuvo su doctorado en la Universidad de Columbia y ha publicado sus investigaciones en revistas como The American Economic Review, The Journal of Political Economy y The American Journal of Political Science.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 7 de abril de 11:20 a 12:30 h. 

Aula H118 (Ed. Hirsch, 1er Piso).

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Social Clubs and Political Office

In recent years we have seen significant cases of individuals from wealthy families emerging as candidates for political office. However, there is little systematic literature addressing the determinants of the candidacy of some but not others amongst the wealthy. We build on the literature on social capital to cast light on this question, specifically the literature on the political effects of social club membership. We leverage the creation in 1882 of the Buenos Aires Jockey Club—Argentina’s most prominent elite social club for over the past century. Using a staggered synthetic difference in differences strategy, we find that family and individual membership in the Jockey Club is associated with a significant increase in the probability of running for and winning legislative office. As for the mechanism, we present evidence that Jockey Club membership resulted in greater centrality in marriage networks with other elite families; such connections were exceptionally useful for  mobilizing voters in Argentina’s patronage-based elections.

Ciclo de Seminarios Permanentes

Presentador

Gonzalo Ballestero

- Presencial -

Gonzalo es economista y es candidato doctoral en Economía en Penn State University. Sus principales áreas de investigación incluyen Organización Industrial, Economía de la Educación y Economía Laboral. Obtuvo su Licenciatura en Economía por la Universidad de Buenos Aires y su Maestría en Economía por la Universidad de San Andrés. Ha sido reconocido con el Premio al Investigador Joven de la Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 31 de marzo de 11:20 a 12:30 h. 

Aula H118. Ed. Hirsch, 1er Piso.

Centralized Admission Mechanisms and International Migration

I study how the design of centralized assignment mechanisms affects high-skilled outmigration. Using administrative and nationwide survey data, I show that a substantial fraction of high-scoring applicants migrates abroad after not being matched, raising concerns about brain drain. I develop and estimate a structural model to evaluate the effects of alternative assignment rules on migration outcomes.

Ciclo de Seminarios Permanentes

Presentador

Tommaso Giulla

- Presencial-

Tommaso es economista y realizó la Maestría en Economía en la Universidad de San Andrés y la Msc. in Politics en London School of Economics. Actualmente se encuentra haciendo el Doctorado en Politics en New York University. Su principal área de interés es la Economía Política.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 17 de marzo de 11:20 a 12:30 h. 

Aula H118. Ed. Hirsch, 1er Piso.

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What Candidates Do Parties Pick? Executive Experience and Candidate Selection

I investigate whether executive experience matters to parties’ selection of candidates. Executive officers can be held accountable for achievements and failures. If parties value experience, candidates with satisfactory track records will be preferentially selected. Focusing on the case of Italian local elections, I find that mayors (executive officers) are 10 p.p. more likely to re-run on a party list than runner-ups (their local competitors). I then investigate whether – beyond incumbency – parties evaluate the quality of experience and performance. First, I check whether the probability of re-running on a party list moves along measures of performance in office, finding a positive correlation. Second, I exploit a discontinuous change
in mayors’ competences around municipal population cut-offs. Estimated effects for mayors with broader authority are 8 p.p. larger than those for mayors with narrower authority. Taken together, these results qualify executive experience – beyond incumbency or seniority alone – as a relevant factor in parties’ selection of candidates.

Ciclo de Seminarios Permanentes

Presentador

Francisco Roldán

- Virtual –

Francisco es economista y se desempeña como Economista en el Fondo Monetario Internacional (IMF) desde 2022. Obtuvo su Doctorado en Economía en la Universidad de Nueva York (NYU) en 2019. Sus principales áreas de investigación son la macroeconomía, las finanzas internacionales, las crisis de deuda soberana y las finanzas internacionales.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 3 de marzo de 11:20 a 12:30 h.

Virtual

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The Perils of Bilateral Sovereign Debt

We study the interaction between private and official sovereign debts. We develop a quantitative sovereign default model featuring a senior lender with whom borrowing terms are negotiated. We use this model to evaluate implications of the emergence of new official creditors not bound by the Paris Club framework. The dynamics of bilateral bargaining lead the government to issue more market debt, raising default risk and creating welfare losses. This relational overborrowing effect arises due to an endogenous cross-elasticity of bilateral terms to market debt, which can be assessed in practice to evaluate new forms of bilateral sovereign debt.

Este lunes 22 de diciembre nos reuniremos para realizar la 15º Conferencia de Graduados de UdeSA, con la presentación de trabajos de graduados de nuestro departamento de Economía. Nos gustaría mucho que pudieran participar.

El evento es PRESENCIAL, en el caso de no poder asistir podrás conectarte al siguiente link de Zoom: (https://udesa-edu-ar.zoom.us/j/94109513390).

¡¡Los esperamos!!

Ciclo de Seminarios Permanentes

Presentador

Pablo Zárate

- Presencial –

Pablo es economista y actualmente está realizando el doctorado en Economía en la Universidad de Princeton. Es argentino y obtuvo su Licenciatura y Maestría en Economía en la Universidad de San Andrés. Forma parte del Global Survey of Working Arrangements (G-SWA), un proyecto que releva de manera sistemática las experiencias y percepciones de los trabajadores sobre el trabajo remoto y los esquemas híbridos. Antes de incorporarse a Princeton, se desempeñó como pre-doctoral Research Fellow en el European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 25 de noviembre de 12:20 a 13:30 h. 

Aula M109, Ed. Luis María Otero Monsegur

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Peer Effects in a Long Run

Is it better to be a big fish in a small pond or a small fish in a big pond, both in the short and the long run? We study how initial rank within a peer group, holding absolute ability constant, affects effort dynamics over time. We leverage a natural experiment in a large-scale, high-effort task where individuals are ranked and grouped by ability. Using a regression discontinuity design, preliminary evidence shows that those ranked highest within their group increase their efforts in the short run but reduce them in the medium run, resulting in no long-run differences. These patterns suggest that peer-induced early-career effort may lead to eventual burnout. Over time, these high-ranked individuals tend to get surrounded by weaker peers.

Ciclo de Seminarios Permanentes

Presentador

Federico Weinschelbaum

- Presencial –

Federico es economista y actualmente es profesor del Departamento de Economía e investigador del CONICET. Obtuvo su PhD en la Universidad de California, Los Angeles (UCLA). Fue profesor invitado en diversas instituciones del país y del exterior, y participó como miembro del comité científico y organizador de distintos congresos y conferencias. Sus campos de investigación incluyen teoría de los juegos, teoría microeconómica, incertidumbre y problemas informativos. Sus principales artículos abordan temas de corrupción, subastas, descentralización, informalidad, crimen y teoría de agencia.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 11 de noviembre de 12:20 a 13:30 h. 

Aula M109, Ed. Luis María Otero Monsegur

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Corrupt Voting: Information and Electoral Accountability

Does the ability of the electorate to replace corrupt politicians deter corruption? This paper analyzes the limitations of electoral accountability. We show that if the electorate cannot commit elections offer no defense against corruption. However, when a commitment technology exists, the electorate can strategically choose to remove only those caught taking bribes. This incentivizes corrupt politicians to pass up bribe opportunities for which the value is small. We then examine how improved monitoring can impact outcomes and show that increasing information quality does not always benefit the electorate.

Ciclo de Seminarios Permanentes

Presentador

Carlos Scartascini

- Presencial –

Carlos es economista y Líder Técnico Principal del Departamento de Investigación del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID), donde coordina el Grupo de Economía del Comportamiento. Integra el comité ejecutivo del GDLab del BID, el Comité Científico del Real Instituto Elcano y el Comité Asesor del Masters of Behavioral and Decision Sciences de la Universidad de Pennsylvania. Además, es editor asociado de la revista Economía y miembro fundador de LACEA-BRAIN. Obtuvo su Doctorado y Maestría en Economía en la George Mason University (EE. UU.) y su Licenciatura en Economía en la Universidad Nacional del Sur (Argentina).

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 4 de noviembre de 12:20 a 13:30 h. 

Aula M109, Ed. Luis María Otero Monsegur

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Corruption and Political Accountability in Good and Bad Economic Times

While the literature extensively explores the structural enablers of corruption and its adverse effects on economic performance, less is known about how the state of the economy influences corruption and political accountability. To address this gap, we develop a theoretical model in which politicians may divert resources from public goods and citizens can respond by punishing corruption. In our model, periods of positive economic conditions increase corruption while weakening accountability. We validate these predictions through a laboratory experiment, finding that corruption rates significantly rise when economic conditions are good. However, citizens' willingness to punish corrupt politicians remains stable across the business cycle. Punishment decisions are driven by observed public good allocations; low allocations prompt significantly higher punishment rates than high allocations, even resulting in the punishment of honest politicians during bad economic times. Additionally, we assess the role of corruption expectations in shaping responses: citizens with prior beliefs that politicians are corrupt are less likely to punish than those who believe politicians are honest when public good provision is low. Accountability becomes more challenging when citizens struggle to clearly identify corruption, and citizens are more forgiving of corruption during good economic times and if they already mistrust politicians. These findings underscore the importance of robust transparency and accountability mechanisms in upholding governance standards, particularly in the face of economic fluctuations and public mistrust.

Ciclo de Seminarios Permanentes

Presentador

Lucas Ronconi

- Presencial –

Lucas es economista y Profesor de Economía en la Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA). Estudió en la Universidad de San Andrés y obtuvo su doctorado en Economía en la Universidad de California, Berkeley. Antes de incorporarse a la UBA trabajó en el Centro de Investigación y Acción Social (CIAS) y en el Institute for Research on Labor and Employment de UC Berkeley. Además, es investigador afiliado al CONICET. Su agenda de investigación se centra en el estudio de las instituciones laborales en países en desarrollo. Desde mayo de 2017 es Research Fellow del Instituto de Estudios Laborales (IZA).

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 14 de octubre de 12:20 a 13:30 h. 

Aula M109, Ed. Luis María Otero Monsegur

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Inattention or (Mis)Information? Explaining the Demand for Anti-inflationary Policies in Argentina

Results from a survey experiment in Argentina document inattention as a source of support for populist, inefficient policies, such as price controls. Individuals who are inattentive to policy expend little cognitive effort and settle for simple narratives that favor policies with direct mechanisms of action, such as price controls. Consistent with this, a majority of respondents rated price controls at least as effective as limits to monetary emission in sustainably controlling inflation. Two information interventions successfully prompt individuals to reconsider their simple inflation narratives: treated respondents have higher relative evaluations of monetary policy relative to price controls. Moreover, consistent with inattention, both treatments raise evaluations of the more complex monetary policy but leave evaluations of price controls, associated with the simple narrative, unchanged.  Both treatment effects are significantly larger among respondents who spent more time on the survey – paid more attention to it. The results also shed new light on the role of ideology. If policy evaluations were the product of deep-seated ideological commitments, the treatments would be ineffective among the most ideologically committed.  Instead, treatment effects are the same or larger among individuals with greater ideological commitment, consistent with the use of ideology by low-attention individuals as a low-cost cue to form simple narratives. Finally, treatment effects are not driven by the provision of new information to respondents: results are independent of respondent knowledge and beliefs. 

Ciclo de Seminarios Permanentes

Presentadora

Claudia Vazquez

- Presencial –

Claudia es economista con más de ocho años de experiencia profesional en el diseño, implementación y evaluación de programas sociales liderados por organismos multilaterales. Actualmente se desempeña como Programme Officer en la Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM) en Argentina, donde dirige la Unidad de Programas. Entre 2014 y 2020 fue consultora económica de largo plazo en la División de Mercados Laborales y Seguridad Social del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID). Es doctora en la Universidad de San Andrés, cuenta con una Maestría en Economía (Universidad de La Plata) y es Licenciada en Economía (Universidad de Buenos Aires). Sus intereses de investigación abarcan las políticas públicas, la inversión en capital humano, la economía laboral y la migración.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 7 de octubre de 12:20 a 13:30 h. 

Aula M109, Ed. Luis María Otero Monsegur

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Promoción del desarrollo infantil mediante programas de apoyo a la crianza: evidencia experimental en Argentina

Este artículo evalúa los impactos de corto plazo de Primeros Pasos, un programa de apoyo a la crianza implementado en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Argentina. Primeros Pasos es una adaptación local del modelo Reach Up, desarrollado originalmente en Jamaica, que introduce dos innovaciones: (i) la focalización en niños de 6 a 24 meses con rezago en el desarrollo, y (ii) la modalidad de entrega en sesiones individuales en centros de primera infancia, en lugar de visitas domiciliarias. El estudio se diseñó como un experimento controlado aleatorizado con 150 niños y sus familias, con mediciones en la línea de base y luego de finalizada la intervención. Los resultados muestran mejoras significativas en las habilidades cognitivas, de lenguaje receptivo y de motricidad fina, con tamaños de efecto entre 0,23 y 0,41 desviaciones estándar. Asimismo, se observaron cambios positivos en las prácticas de crianza en el hogar. La magnitud de los impactos es comparable a la documentada en intervenciones similares en América Latina, a pesar de la menor duración del programa.

Ciclo de Seminarios Permanentes

Presentador

Joaquín Coleff

- Presencial –

Joaquín es economista y se desempeña como profesor en la Universidad Nacional de La Plata (UNLP) desde 2017, además de ser investigador en el Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales y Sociales (CEDLAS). Su experiencia previa incluye su labor como profesor asistente de Economía en la Universidad del Rosario entre 2011 y 2015. En cuanto a su formación académica, Joaquín obtuvo su Doctorado (Ph.D.) y Maestría (M.A.) en Economía en la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (UC3M). Sus intereses de investigación se centran en la Organización Industrial y la Economía Organizacional, con un enfoque adicional en Regulaciones y Teoría Microeconómica Aplicada.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 30 de septiembre de 12:20 a 13:30 h. 

Aula M109, Ed. Luis María Otero Monsegur

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On Collusion and the Number of Firms

Collusion persists in many markets, fueled by supra-competitive profits. A large body of theory predicts that cartels are less likely as the number of firms rises. We show, by contrast, that under broad conditions incentives to collude can increase with firm count. The mechanism is simple: competitive profits fall faster than collusive profits as the number of firms grows, raising the reward from coordination. This challenges a core premise of U.S. and European antitrust policy and helps reconcile theory with empirical evidence of cartels with many participants. The result holds for price and quantity competition, whether or not self-enforcement binds.

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Presentadora

María Lombardi

- Presencial –

María es economista y profesora asistente en la Escuela de Gobierno de la Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Obtuvo su doctorado en Economía en la Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Su investigación se centra en analizar los efectos de las políticas públicas en países en desarrollo, con especial énfasis en el ámbito educativo. Sus principales áreas de investigación son la economía del desarrollo, la economía de la educación y la economía laboral.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 23 de septiembre de 12:20 a 13:30 h. 

Aula M109, Ed. Luis María Otero Monsegur

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The pitfalls of higher selectivity: Evidence on university degree completion

We study the effect of selectivity on university degree completion. Using data from the centralized university admission system in Chile, we use a regression discontinuity design with students at the margin of admission between relatively more and less selective university programs. We find that students marginally admitted to a more selective program are 2.3 percentage points less likely to graduate from their initial program, compared to marginally rejected students who were instead admitted to the relatively less selective option. We also find a 1.9 percentage point drop in the likelihood of obtaining any university degree. For students who graduate, we find a one month increase in time to graduation. This decline in overall graduation rates is driven by lower-income students, who face greater challenges in transferring and completing a degree elsewhere. We find suggestive evidence that these results are driven by higher academic rigor and negative peer effects, rather than by ordinal rank.

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Presentador

Danila Medvedev

- Presencial –

Danila es psicólogo con un PhD en Behavioral Science de la University of Chicago Booth School of Business. Su investigación explora cómo las estructuras de incentivos en el entorno influyen en la forma en que las personas piensan y actúan. Actualmente es Postdoctoral Research Fellow en el Dispute Resolution Research Center de Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management. Su trabajo combina ciencia del comportamiento y aplicaciones prácticas en la toma de decisiones.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 9 de septiembre de 12:20 a 13:30 h. 

Aula M109, Ed. Luis María Otero Monsegur

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Global Rich and Poor

Do the rich converge into a culturally uniform “global elite,” and is there consensus on how people view them? We first split 259,388 people from 92 countries by relative income and compare the endorsement of 110 moral, economic, and political values between the relative “haves” and “have-nots” in each country. Higher income is associated with lower religiosity, greater trust in strangers and institutions, and greater acceptance of abortion and homosexuality. These correlations are robust across the Global North but are weaker, often absent, or even reversed in the Global South. As a result, higher-income groups display greater cultural differentiation across countries. Using a different dataset (N = 72,390), we observe the same pattern in the United States: the rich vary more across nine US regions than do the poor. In a separate study, we survey 29,450 people in 140 countries about their stereotypes of and attitudes toward the rich and the poor. Both within and across countries, people are more polarized in their views of the rich than of the poor. In the Global South, people see the rich as more tolerant and secular than the data show; in the Global North, people overestimate the extent to which the rich are prejudiced and undemocratic. Attitudes toward the rich are markedly more negative in the Global North, though this North–South difference narrows on more implicit measures. Negativity toward the rich is not explained by standard measures of inequality. Instead, attitudes toward the rich are most negative where the top 1% and 10% derive a larger share of income from capital rather than labor.

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Si sos estudiante de grado y cursás en CABA, vení a la segunda edición de UdeSA Career Camp en la combi. 

Te pasamos a buscar por la sede Riobamba para que no te pierdas la feria laboral.

Estos son los días y horarios

Martes 9 de septiembre

• Salida de Sede Riobamba: 13.00 h
• Vuelta del Campus a las 17.30 h

Miércoles 10 de septiembre

• Ida de Sede Riobamba: 13.00 h
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Cupos limitados, ¡no te quedes sin tu lugar!

Importante:

• Si finalmente no podés venir, avisanos para darle lugar a otro estudiante.
• Tenés tiempo de anotarte hasta el 8 de septiembre o hasta que se terminen los cupos.

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       Para estudiantes y graduados de la Universidad de San Andrés con menos de 5 años de experiencia.

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En este espacio, las personas participantes podrán practicar en vivo y recibir feedback inmediato para mejorar sus respuestas y aumentar sus posibilidades de éxito.

Durante la actividad:

• Se responderá una pregunta real de entrevista.

• Se brindará devolución personalizada al instante.

• Se trabajará en cómo contar experiencias de manera clara y convincente.

Se recomienda traer el CV actualizado para aprovechar al máximo la práctica.

¡Te esperamos en la nueva cafetería del Quad!

Facilita

Natalia Suarez y Julieta Sueldo
Especialistas en Desarrollo Profesional UdeSA

Actualizá tu foto de LinkedIn 

Miércoles 27 de agosto - 12 a 16 h | Hall primer piso, edificio Sullair

Te esperamos junto a una fotógrafa, para renovar tu foto profesional en LinkedIn, CV y perfil de Conectar UdeSA.

• Acercate a la sala.
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Presentador

Gastón Nievas

- Presencial –

Gastón es economista y está haciendo su doctorado en Economía en la Paris School of Economics (PSE). Además, se desempeña como coordinador de Cuentas Nacionales en el World Inequality Lab (WIL). Antes de incorporarse a la PSE trabajó durante dos años como investigador en el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo y un año en el Banco Mundial. Sus intereses de investigación se ubican en la Economía Política Internacional y la Geoeconomía, con un enfoque particular en Macroeconomía Internacional.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 26 de agosto de 12:20 a 13:30 h. 

Aula M109, Ed. Luis María Otero Monsegur

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Unequal Exchange and North-South Relations: Evidence from Global Trade Flows and the World Balance of Payments 1800-2025

This paper constructs a new database on global trade flows and the world balance of payments (goods, services, income, transfers) for 57 core territories from 1800 to 2025. We analyze long-run patterns of global imbalances and net foreign wealth accumulation over more than two centuries. We quantify the role of colonial transfers and low commodity prices (due to forced labor) in Europe's foreign wealth build-up before 1914. We compare this to post-1970 global imbalances and stress the enduring impact of unequal exchange and bargaining power. We also provide counterfactual simulations on foreign wealth accumulation under alternative trade & monetary regimes.

Tu CV es la primera puerta hacia nuevas oportunidades laborales.
En este espacio vas a poder traer el tuyo y revisarlo junto al equipo de Desarrollo Profesional para que refleje todo lo que tenés para aportar.

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Tomate un rato para pulir tu CV y asegurarte de que comunique todo tu potencial.

¡Te esperamos en la nueva cafetería del Quad!

Facilita

Laura Bidegain, Julieta Sueldo y Anabel Secches

Especialistas en Desarrollo Profesional

Ciclo de Seminarios Permanentes

Presentador

Santiago Camara

- Presencial –

Santiago es economista y desde 2023 se desempeña como profesor asistente en el Departamento de Economía de la Universidad McGill. Su investigación se sitúa en la intersección entre la economía internacional y la política monetaria, con énfasis en cómo los shocks financieros en economías avanzadas se transmiten hacia los mercados emergentes. Obtuvo su Doctorado en Economía en 2025 en la Universidad de Northwestern.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 19 de agosto de 12:20 a 13:30 h. 

Aula M109, Ed. Luis María Otero Monsegur

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Global Banks' Spillovers to Emerging Markets: Macro to Micro Transmission

We study the macroeconomic and microeconomic transmission of global bank credit supply shocks to Emerging Market Economies (EMEs). Using the identification strategy of Ottonello & Song (2024), which exploits high-frequency co-movements between global banks’ net worth and credit spreads, we isolate exogenous shifts in global credit supply. Positive shocks ease financial conditions in EMEs, boosting capital inflows, domestic credit, and real activity. These effects are robust across countries, specifications, and alternative estimation methods. Using detailed administrative data from Uruguay, we show that less leveraged and more liquid banks expand lending more aggressively following global credit easing. At the firm level, borrowing responses are systematically smaller for more indebted firms, particularly those with weaker collateral or credit quality. These results suggest that financial heterogeneity shapes the international transmission of global credit supply shocks, with balance sheet strength playing a central role in determining which banks and firms benefit most from favorable global financial conditions.

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Presentadora

Liliana Varela

- Presencial –

Liliana es economista y se desempeña como Assistant Professor en el Departamento de Finanzas de la London School of Economics desde 2019. Obtuvo su Ph.D. en Economía en la Paris School of Economics en 2014. Su investigación se centra en finanzas internacionales, macroeconomía y economía internacional, con énfasis en capitales, tipo de cambio y firmas globales. Es Associate Editor del Journal of International Economics y forma parte del CEPR y del Centre for Macroeconomics. Además, trabaja como consultora académica para el Banco de Inglaterra.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 12 de agosto de 12:20 a 13:30 h. 

Aula M109, Ed. Luis María Otero Monsegur

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Segmented Financial Integration

This paper studies the granularity of international financial integration by creating a unique, administrative, micro-level dataset covering the quasi-universe of France’s cross-border positions between 2014 and 2018. We show that France's financial integration is granular, as the top one percentile of firms account for almost 60% of France’s gross cross-border positions. Notably, these granular agents have a distinct cross-border investment pattern than the rest of (smaller) groups, resulting in a segmented pattern of financial integration. In particular,  granular firms are well diversified across countries and do not show home bias, while the rest of firms allocate all their cross-border investments in the European Union and Euro.

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Presentador

Lian Allub

- Presencial –

Lian es economista y se desempeña como Economista Principal en la División de Estudios Socioeconómicos de CAF. Obtuvo su Doctorado en Economía en la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid en 2014. Sus áreas de investigación incluyen macroeconomía, crecimiento y desarrollo, y economía internacional. Previamente fue Max Weber Fellow y profesor en el Instituto Universitario Europeo.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 5 de agosto de 12:20 a 13:30 h. 

Aula M109, Ed. Luis María Otero Monsegur

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In this paper we study the role of financial frictions in the composition of capital of firms, and its effects on output and TFP. In the model, structures can be used as collateral while equipment can not, which delivers that even under perfect credit markets can exist constrained entrepreneurs. We calibrate the model and perform counterfactual analysis varying the level of financial development to study the effects of credit on the composition of capital, TFP and output.

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Presentador

Alejandro Vicondoa

- Presencial –

Alejandro es economista y actualmente se desempeña como Associate Professor en el Instituto de Economía de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, donde también dirige el programa de doctorado en Economía. Obtuvo su Ph.D. en Economía en el European University Institute en 2017. Sus áreas de investigación incluyen macroeconomía internacional, finanzas internacionales, economía monetaria y macroeconometría. Ha sido editor asociado en Oxford Open Economics y en Review of World Economics. Además, ha trabajado como consultor externo para el Banco de Inglaterra y ha realizado estancias de investigación en la Universidad de Wisconsin-Madison. 

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 22 de julio de 12:20 a 13:30 h. 

Aula M109, Ed. Luis María Otero Monsegur

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Capital Flows to Emerging Markets: Disentangling Quantities from Prices

We study the joint dynamics in the volume and prices of capital flows to emerging market economies (EMEs). A dynamic factor model complemented with sign and zero restrictions allows us to identify demand/supply shocks of idiosyncratic/common nature. While common credit supply shocks are the main driver of prices, idiosyncratic credit demand and supply shocks account for most of the variation in quantities. A structural multi-country SOE/RBC model is calibrated to EMEs data to further shed light on the main transmission channels. Augmented with correlated productivity and interest rate shocks, the model matches the comovement between prices and quantities as well as business cycle moments. Common credit demand drivers, captured as correlated TFP shocks, account for around half of the observed comovement in quantities but they are not a significant driver of price comovement. Fundamentals matter significantly more for capital flows than for country spreads, which are driven by a sizeable global financial cycle.

Ciclo de Seminarios Permanentes

Presentador

Franco Riottini Depetris

- Presencial –

Franco es economista con una maestría en Economía de la Universidad de San Andrés (UdeSA), donde también se desempeñó como asistente predoctoral. Sus intereses de investigación se centran en economía internacional, econometría aplicada y desarrollo económico, con un enfoque en el uso de técnicas de machine learning para el análisis económico. Actualmente trabaja como consultor para organismos internacionales como el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo y el Banco Mundial, y a partir de agosto comenzará su doctorado en Economía en la Universidad de Michigan.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 15 de julio de 12:20 a 13:30 h. 

Aula M109, Ed. Luis María Otero Monsegur

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The Value of Organic Certifications

The global surge in demand for organic products raises key questions about how certification affects firms along agricultural value chains. We estimate the impact of USDA Organic—the world’s largest certification system—on Latin American exporters. Using a novel dataset that links certification records to agricultural export transactions from ten countries (2012–2019), we implement a within-firm-product-destination difference-in-differences strategy. Certified firms increase exports to the U.S. by ~15\%, primarily through higher volumes. Effects differ by firm type: certification boosts quantities for handlers, while for producers it raises unit values. These results suggest that certification facilitates entry into high-value markets by reducing information frictions. To interpret these patterns and inform policy, we develop a vertical integration model with Melitz-type heterogeneous firms selecting into supply chain stages. We recover structural parameters and simulate counterfactuals to assess policies encouraging certification uptake.

Ciclo de Seminarios Permanentes

Presentador

Eduardo Levy Yeyati

- Presencial –

Eduardo es economista y actualmente Profesor Plenario en la Escuela de Gobierno de la Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (UTDT). Además, se desempeña como Senior Fellow en el Global Development Program del Brookings Institution y como Regional Advisor en el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID). Obtuvo su Ph.D. en Economía en la University of Pennsylvania. Sus principales áreas de interés incluyen las finanzas de mercados emergentes, la política monetaria y cambiaria, la arquitectura financiera internacional y el crecimiento económico en países en desarrollo.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 8 de julio de 12:20 a 13:30 h. 

Aula M109, Ed. Luis María Otero Monsegur

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The Benign Effect of International Reserves on Sovereign Credit Spreads and Crisis Propensity: The Source Matters

Recent studies have highlighted the benign impact of holding liquid international reserves on sovereign credit risk premiums. In this paper, we complement these studies by estimating the differential impact of reserves according to whether they are purchased against the issuance of foreign-currency public debt as in the precautionary case, or through the issuance of local-currency securities as in the case on leaning-against-the-wind (LAW) interventions. We use an empirical identification of the two motives based on the balance of payments flows, and document that, while there is a benign and significant impact on spreads from both precautionary and LAW reserve accumulation, the latter displays a significantly and consistently stronger effect. We also show that the same pattern applies to the effect of reserves on crisis propensity, defined as the probability of facing external financial stress (as captured by a credit spread above 1000 basis points).

Ciclo de Seminarios Permanentes

Presentadora

Eugenia Andreasen

- Presencial –

Eugenia es economista especializada en macroeconomía, finanzas internacionales y políticas públicas. Su investigación se centra en deuda soberana, flujos de capital y regulación macroprudencial. Además de su trabajo académico, ha sido consultora para el Banco Mundial y el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, asesorando en temas de política macroeconómica y financiera. También participa en debates de política económica a través del Monetary Policy Group. Actualmente, dirige la Maestría en Análisis Económico de la Universidad de Chile.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 1 de julio de 12:20 a 13:30 h. 

Aula M109, Ed. Luis María Otero Monsegur

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Sovereign risk, firm financing and international trade

This paper studies how rising sovereign risk affects international trade, combining empirical evidence with a quantitative model. Using panel data on exports and imports by industry and country, we show that increases in sovereign Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spreads reduce imports—especially in sectors that are more import-intensive and reliant on external finance. Export declines are observed only in more finance-dependent industries. We develop a multi-industry small open economy model with heterogeneous firms subject to working capital constraints, international trade, and a government that finances public spending with taxes or defaultable debt. We calibrate the model to match key trade and sovereign default moments, and find that higher sovereign spreads raise firms’ borrowing costs, depreciate the real exchange rate, and reduce wages. These general equilibrium effects lead to lower imports and sales, with the largest impact in sectors that are both import- and working-capital-intensive. Exports may rise due to real depreciation and wage declines, but the response is weaker in more finance-dependent industries.

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Presentador

Ramiro Gálvez

- Presencial –

Ramiro es economista y Doctor en Ciencias de la Computación por la Universidad de Buenos Aires. Sus intereses de investigación se centran en el uso de técnicas de Machine Learning y Natural Language Processing (NLP), con un enfoque interdisciplinario que combina economía aplicada y ciencia de datos.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 24 de junio de 12:20 a 13:30 h. 

Aula M109, Ed. Luis María Otero Monsegur

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The Wikipedia Effect: Accelerating Interdisciplinary Science in Times of Need

This paper examines Wikipedia’s role in the diffusion of scientific knowledge, focusing on its impact during the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, when many researchers faced an urgent need to acquire unfamiliar epidemiological expertise. Using the synthetic control method with multiple treated units, we assess whether scholarly articles referenced in Wikipedia’s entry on compartmental models in epidemiology, which outlines the widely used SIR model, experienced disproportionately large increases in citations compared to similar, unreferenced articles. We find that Wikipedia-cited articles saw a substantial citation surplus during the early pandemic, with the effect tapering in subsequent years as research priorities shifted. This increase was driven primarily by researchers with no prior engagement with the field, particularly through citations classified as background or methodological. The effect was strongest in applied disciplines such as medicine and economics, and weaker in more theoretical fields such as mathematics and computer science. These findings challenge academic norms that discourage citing Wikipedia, revealing the platform’s tangible influence on scientific knowledge flows. More broadly, they suggest that Wikipedia can serve as an effective and informal gateway to specialized knowledge, especially during periods of heightened scientific demand.

Ciclo de Seminarios Permanentes

Presentador

Carlos Zarazaga

- Presencial –

Carlos es economista y obtuvo su PhD en la Universidad de Minnesota. Actualmente trabaja en la Reserva Federal de EE. UU. (Dallas), donde ocupa el cargo de Senior Research Economist. Su investigación se centra en la interacción entre política fiscal y monetaria.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 17 de junio de 12:20 a 13:30 h. 

Aula M109, Ed. Luis María Otero Monsegur

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Quantifying Discretionary Fiscal Policy’s contribution of U.S. inflation

The surge of inflation following the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic, preceded by historically large fiscal deficits, has reignited an old-standing debate about the fiscal policy responsibility in inflationary outcomes. This paper sets out to contribute to that debate by empirically assessing the role that policy had on the post-pandemic inflation spike, disciplined by the requirement that such contribution had to be consistent with the U.S. experience for the entire 1960-2022 period, as inspected through the lens of a well-established model of the U.S. economy. To that end, the paper incorporates a fiscal block in the Smets and Wouter’s model (2007) that overcomes the limitation that the active monetary-passive fiscal policy regime assumed by that paper does not let fiscal debt policy have any effect on inflation, other than "passively" validating the inflation "actively" controlled by the monetary authority. The augmented model makes it possible to postulate an alternative passive monetary-active fiscal policy configuration that allows "Non-Ricardian" orthogonal shocks to contemporaneous U.S. Federal primary budget deficits to be an independent source of unanticipated inflation or deflation. The paper finds that such shocks contributed to roughly one-third of the 2021-2022 post-Covid increase in inflation, and that they played yet a more significant role during the 1970s and 1980s, when their contribution to the rise and fall of inflation was roughly 50%. From a more historical perspective, the results of this paper suggest that non-Ricardian fiscal shocks have been a non-negligible source of U.S. inflation, accounting for 25% of the one-year-ahead inflation forecast error variance and for 64% of the unconditional variance in inflation over the period 1960-2022.

Ciclo de Seminarios Permanentes

Presentador

Pedro Martínez Bruera

- Presencial –

Pedro es Licenciado en Economía por la Universidad Católica Argentina (UCA) y actualmente se encuentra en su último año de doctorado en el Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Sus principales áreas de interés son la Macroeconomía, la Economía Internacional y la Econometría con series de tiempo.

Fecha, hora y lugar

Martes 10 de junio de 12:20 a 13:30 h. 

Aula M109, Ed. Luis María Otero Monsegur

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Hawkish Dove or Dovish Hawk? Optimal Monetary Policy with Reputational Concerns

A central bank’s reputation depends on how hawkish the private sector thinks it is. Using cross-sectional variation of private forecasts about US inflation and output gap, we document i) reputation responds to monetary policy surprises ii) is mean-reverting iii) does not respond to non-monetary shocks such as demand and cost-push shocks iv) better reputation reduces the passthrough of shocks to inflation expectations. We embed these facts in a learning model and solve the optimal monetary policy problem. Relative to the solution under discretion, the optimal policy is more hawkish: by acting more hawkish, the central bank signals stronger commitment to inflation stability, anchoring expectations in the future, and reducing the future cost of disinflation.